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Abstract 
 
Häckner (2000) shows that in a differentiated oligopoly with more than two firms , prices may 
be higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition, implying that the classical 
result of Singh and Vives (1984) that Bertrand prices are always lower than Cournot prices is sensitive 
to the duopoly assumption. Häckner (2000), however, leaves unanswered the important question of 
whether welfare may be lower under price competition. This note shows that in Häckner’s model both 
consumer surplus and total surplus are higher under price competition than under quantity competition 
regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements.   
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1.  Introduction 
In their classical paper, Singh and Vives (1984) show that in a differentiated duopoly with 
linear demands and constant marginal costs both consumer surplus and total surplus (the sum of 
consumer surplus and total industry profit) are higher under Bertrand price competition than under 
Cournot quantity competition regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements. This result 
is due to their established result that quantities are lower and prices higher in Cournot than in Bertrand 
competition, and the facts that consumer surplus is decreasing and convex in prices and that total 
surplus is increasing and concave in quantities.  In a recent paper, Häckner (2000) shows that in a 
differentiated oligopoly with more than two firms and vertical quality differentiation, prices may be 
higher under price competition than under quantity competition, implying that Singh and Vives’ 
results on prices and quantities are sensitive to the duopoly assumption.  However, Häckner (2000) 
leaves unanswered the important question of whether welfare may be lower under price competition 
than under quantity competition. 1  
This note shows that in Häckner’s model both consumer surplus and total surplus are higher 
under price competition than under quantity competition regardless of whether goods are substitutes or 
complements. Thus Singh and Vives’ conclusion on welfare continues to hold in Häckner’s 
oligopolistic  model. While uniform ranking of prices between Bertrand and Cournot competition 
guarantees a definitive ranking on welfare, it is not necessary. In Häckner’s model, Bertrand prices can 
be higher than Cournot prices but this happens only for low-quality firms and when quality differences 
across firms are large. Both conditions imply that the low-quality firms have less significant effects on 
the overall welfare. Indeed, it is shown in the following that price reversal for low-quality firms is 
never significant enough to make welfare smaller under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.  
 
 
                                                 
1  Indeed, Häckner (2000) states that “The welfare issue becomes too complex in a general setting” (p. 233).  
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2.  The Häckner Model 
Häckner (2000) considers an n-firm (n ³  3) differentiated goods oligopoly model with quality 
differentiation that is a direct generalization of the duopoly model developed by Dixit (1979). For 
convenience, the same notation as in Häckner (2000) is adopted here. There is a representative 
consumer with the following quasi-linear utility function: 
U(q, I) = 
n n
2
i i i i j
i 1 i 1 i j
1
q ( q 2 q q ) I
2= = ¹
a - + g +å å å .   (1) 
In (1), q = 1 n(q , ,q )L  is the quantity vector with each iq  denoting the consumer’s consumption of 
good i; ia  > 0 denotes the quality of good i;  [ 1,1]g Î -   is the substitution parameter; I is a composite 
measure of the consumer’s consumption of all other goods. The n goods are substitutes, independent 
or complements according as 0, 0, or 0g > = < .  
Let ip  denote the price of good i, m the consumer’s income, and the composite good’s price 
be normalized to 1. Maximizing U(q, I) subject to the budget constraint that 
n
i ii 1
p q I m
=
+ £å  gives 
the inverse demand equations: 
k k k j
j k
p q q
¹
= a - - gå ,       k = 1, …, n. (2) 
Let 
n
ii 1
( ) / n
=
a = aå  denote the average product quality. Using the inverse demand system (2) and 
assuming all firms produce at zero costs, Häckner (2000) derived the Cournot equilibrium prices and 
quantities for firm k, given by 
C C k
k kp q (n 1) 2 2
a - aa= = +
g - + - g
,  (3) 
and the Bertrand equilibrium prices and quantities for firm k, given by 
B
k k
1 (n 1) 1
p ( )
(n 3) 2 (2n 3) 2
- g g - += a + a - a
g - + g - +
,   (4) 
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B
k k
(n 2) 1 (n 2) 1
q ( )
[ (n 3) 2][ (n 1) 1] (1 )[ (2n 3) 2]
g - + g - += a + a -a
g - + g - + - g g - +
.  (5) 
Here, (3)-(5) are expressed in a form that will facilitate later calculations. As can be seen from (3)-(5), 
equilibrium prices and quantities for each good k are linear combinations of the average quality and 
the difference between good k’s quality and the average quality. These relationships will help us to 
express both consumer surplus and total surplus as linear combinations of the average quality squared 
and the variance of product quality. 
 
3.  Bertrand vs. Cournot: Welfare Comparison 
 Let a  = 1 n( , , )a aL  denote the quality vector and A the following n n´  matrix:  
A = 
1
1
.
1
g gé ù
ê úg gê ú
ê ú
ê ú
g gê úë û
L
L
M M O M
L
 
Then the representative consumer’s utility function (1) can be rewritten as U(q, I) = a q’ - qAq’/2+I  
and the maximizing conditions (2) can be rewritten as p = a - qA, where p = 1 n( p , ,p )L  is the price 
vector. Hence consumer surplus (CS) is given by 
 CS = U(q, I)- ( pq’+I) = qAq’/2.  
Applying to this expression the matrix identity that A = (1 )- g In + g 1n where In is the n n´  identity 
matrix and 1n is the n n´  matrix of all 1’s, one obtains 
CS = 
n n
2 2
i i
i 1 i 1
1
q ( q )
2 2= =
- g g
+å å  =  
n
2 2
i
i 1
1 n[ (n 1) 1]
(q q) (q)
2 2=
- g g - +
- +å , (6) 
where 
n
ii 1
q ( q ) / n
=
= å  is the average quantity.  
 Under Cournot competition, average quantity is Cq
(n 1) 2
a=
g - +
 and C C kkq q 2
a - a
- =
- g
. 
Substituting these into (6) gives the consumer surplus under Cournot competition:  
  
 
6 
CCS = 2 2
2 2
n(1 ) n[ (n 1) 1]
( )
2(2 ) 2[ (n 1) 2]a
- g g - +s + a
- g g - +
, (7) 
where 2as  = 
n 2
ii 1
( ( ) ) / n
=
a -aå  is the variance of product quality. Similarly, by use of (5) and (6), the 
consumer surplus under Bertrand competition is  
BCS = 
2 2
2 2
2 2
n[ (n 2) 1] n[ (n 2) 1]
( )
2(1 )[ (2n 3) 2] 2[ (n 3) 2] [ (n 1) 1]a
g - + g - +
s + a
- g g - + g - + g - +
. (8) 
 Total surplus (TS) is the sum of consumer surplus and total industry profit (
n
i ii 1
p q
=
P = å ). 
By utilizing (3), the total profit under Cournot competition is 
CP  = 
n
C 2
i
i 1
(q )
=
å  = 
n
C C 2 C 2
i
i 1
(q q ) n(q )
=
- +å  = 2 22 2
n n
( )
(2 ) [ (n 1) 2]a
s + a
- g g - +
. (9) 
By use of (4) and (5), the total profit under Bertrand competition is 
BP  = 
n
B 2
i
i 1
(1 )[ (n 1) 1]
(q )
(n 2) 1 =
- g g - +
g - + å  = 
n
B B 2 B 2
i
i 1
(1 )[ (n 1) 1]
[ (q q ) n(q ) ]
(n 2) 1 =
- g g - +
- +
g - + å  
        = 2 2
2 2
n[ (n 1) 1][ (n 2) 1] n(1 )[ (n 2) 1]
( )
(1 )[ (2n 3) 2] [ (n 3) 2] [ (n 1) 1]a
g - + g - + - g g - +s + a
- g g - + g - + g - +
. 
(10) 
Summing (7) and (9) gives the total surplus under Cournot competition 
CTS  = 2 2
2 2
n(3 ) n[ (n 1) 3]
( )
2(2 ) 2[ (n 1) 2]a
- g g - +s + a
- g g - +
. (11) 
Summing (8) and (10) gives the total surplus under Bertrand competition 
BTS  = 2 2
2 2
n[ (n 2) 1][ (3n 4) 3] n[ (n 2) 1][ (n 4) 3]
( )
2(1 )[ (2n 3) 2] 2[ (n 3) 2] [ (n 1) 1]a
g - + g - + g - + g - +s + a
- g g - + g - + g - +
. (12) 
 The preceding expressions indicate that both consumer surplus and total surplus are 
expressible as linear combinations of the variance of product quality and the average quality squared. 
The following proposition shows that both coefficients in these linear combinations are greater under 
Bertrand than under Cournot competition, resulting in larger consumer surplus and total surplus under 
Bertrand than under Cournot competition.  
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Proposition 1.  Consumer surplus and total surplus are higher under Bertrand than under Cournot 
competition regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements; they are equal in Bertrand 
and Cournot competition when goods are independent. 
 
Proof.  As in Häckner (2000), we assume that 1/(n 1)g > - - , i.e., the second-order condition for an 
interior solution under Bertrand competition holds. 2  Consider first consumer surplus. Taking the 
difference between (7) and (8) gives 
 C BCS CS-  
 = 
2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
n(n 1) (3n 5) 2 (2n 5) 4 (2n 7n 5) 2 (3n 5) 4
{ ( ) }
2 (2 ) [ (2n 3) 2] [ (n 1) 2] [ (n 3) 2] [ (n 1) 1]a
- g g - - g - - g - + + g - +
s - a
- g g - + g - + g - + g - +
. 
Obviously, C BCS CS-  is equal to zero when g  = 0. For 0g ¹ , the sign of C BCS CS-  depends on the 
signs of the two numerators inside the above braces; it is negative if the first numerator is negative and 
the second numerator is positive. The first numerator (i.e., 2(3n 5) 2 (2n 5) 4g - - g - - ) is a U-shaped 
function of g ; it is negative for all g  in the interval ( 2(2n 5 4n 8n 5)/(3n 5)- - - + - , 
2(2n 5 4n 8n 5)/(3n 5)- + - + - ). It is easy to verify that this interval includes ( 1/(n 1)- - , 1] as a 
subinterval for all n ³  3. Hence, the first numerator in the above braces is negative provided 
1/(n 1)g > - -  and n ³  3. The second numerator (i.e., 2 2(2n 7n 5) 2 (3n 5) 4g - + + g - + ) is also U-
shaped in g ; it is positive for all g  > 2 2[ (3n 5) n 2n 5]/(2n 7n 5)- - + - + - + , which is less than 
1/(n 1)- -  for all n ³  3. Hence, the second numerator in the above braces is positive provided 
1/(n 1)g > - -  and n ³  3. We have thus shown that C BCS CS-  < 0 except when g  = 0, in which case 
the difference is equal to zero.  
 Consider next total surplus. Taking the difference between (11) and (12) yields 
                                                 
2  Also as in Häckner (2000), we assume here that all firms produce a positive level of output under both Cournot 
and Bertrand competition.  
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C BTS TS-  
= 
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
n(n 1) (n 1) 2 (2n 3) 4 (n 1) 2 (n 3) 4
{ ( ) }
2 (1 )(2 ) [ (2n 3) 2] [ (n 1) 2] [ (n 3) 2] [ (n 1) 1]a
- g g - - g - - g - - g - -
s + a
- g - g g - + g - + g - + g - +
. 
Obviously, C BTS TS-  is equal to zero when g  = 0. For 0g ¹ , the sign of C BTS TS-  is determined 
by the signs of the two numerators inside the above braces. The first numerator (i.e., the expression: 
2(n 1) 2 (2n 3) 4g - - g - - ) is a U-shaped function of g ; it is negative for all g  in the interval  
( 2(2n 3 4n 8n 5)/(n 1)- - - + - , 2(2n 3 4n 8n 5)/(n 1)- + - + - ). It is easy to verify that this interval 
includes ( 1/(n 1)- - , 1] as a subinterval for all n ³  3. Hence, the first numerator in the above braces is 
negative provided that 1/(n 1)g > - -  and n ³  3. The second numerator ( 2(n 1) 2 (n 3) 4g - - g - - ) is 
also a U-shaped function of g ; it is negative for all g in the interval ( 2(n 3 n 2n 5)/(n 1)- - - + - , 
2(n 3 n 2n 5)/(n 1)- + - + - ). It is easy to verify that this interval includes ( 1/(n 1)- - , 1] as a 
subinterval for all n ³  3. Hence, the second numerator in the above braces is negative provided that 
1/(n 1)g > - -  and n ³  3.  We have thus shown that C BTS TS-  < 0 except when g  = 0, in which case 
the difference is equal to zero.  
 
4.  Discussion 
Häckner (2000) shows that, in a differentiated goods oligopoly with three or more firms, if 
quality differences are large and goods are complementary low-quality firms may charge higher prices 
under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. The reason for this result is the asymmetric effects 
that switching from quantity to price competition has on firms of different qualities. Compared to 
quantity competition, prices are lower and demands higher for high-quality producers (i.e., the large 
firms) under price competition. With complementary goods and a substitution rate that is uniform 
across all goods, the demand for low-quality goods may become so high under price competition that 
it enables low-quality producers to charge prices that are higher than those under quantity competit ion.  
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While Häckner is silent on welfare comparisons, this note has shown that in Häckner’s model 
Bertrand competition leads to higher consumer surplus and total surplus than Cournot competit ion 
regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements. The reason behind our result is the 
following. Firm k’s output share is Bks  = 
B
k
B
q
Q
 = k1 [ (n 3) 2][ (n 1) 1]
n n(1 )[ (2n 3) 2]
a - ag - + g - ++ ×
- g g - + a
 in the Bertrand 
equilibrium and is Cks  = 
C
k
C
q
Q
 = k1 (n 1) 2
n n(2 )
a - ag - ++ ×
- g a
 in the Cournot equilibrium. 3  In either 
equilibrium output levels are ranked completely by quality with the highest quality firm selling the 
most and the lowest quality firm selling the least. The difference between the output shares above is 
B C
k ks s-  = 
3
k(n 1)
(1 )(2 )[ (2n 3) 2]
a - a- g
×
- g - g g - + a
, which increases in quality ka  and is positive (i.e., 
B C
k ks s> ) for all firms with above average quality and negative (i.e., 
B C
k ks s< ) for all firms with below 
average quality. Hence, switching from Cournot to Bertrand competition, all firms with above average 
quality obtain larger output shares with the highest quality firm gaining the most in output share and 
all firms with below average quality levels receive smaller output shares with the lowest quality firm 
losing the most in output share. It follows that low-quality firms have insignificant effects on the 
overall welfare. Indeed, Proposition 1 has shown that price increases for low-quality firms are never 
significant enough to make welfare smaller under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.  
 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that total industry output is BQ n ( (n 2) 1)/[( (n 3) 2)( (n 1) 1)]= a g - + g - + g - +  under Bertrand 
competition and is CQ n /[ (n 1) 2]= a g - +  under Cournot competition. It follows that total (and also average) 
output is higher and average price lower under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.  
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